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Abstract
We will show that Sion’s minimax theorem is equivalent to the existence of Nash
equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game. If a zero-sum game is
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1. Introduction
We consider the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem and the existence of
Nash equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game. We will show that
they are equivalent. An example of such a game is a relative profit maximization
game in a Cournot oligopoly. Suppose that there are n ≥ 3 firms in an oligopolistic
industry. Let pii be the absolute profit of the i-th firm. Then, its relative profit is
pii = pii − 1n − 1
n∑
j=1, j,i
pi j.
We see
n∑
i=1
pii =
n∑
i=1
p¯ii − 1n − 1(n − 1)
n∑
j=1
pi j = 0.
Thus, the relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly is a zero-
sum game2. If the oligopoly is asymmetric because the demand function is not
symmetric or firms have different cost functions, maximin strategies and minimax
strategies of firms do not correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. However, if
the demand function is symmetric and the firms have the same cost function, the
maximin strategy and the minimax strategy constitute a Nash equilibrium.
2. The model
Consider a symmetric n-person zero-sum game with n ≥ 3 as follows. There
are n players, 1, 2, . . . , n. The set of players is denoted by N. A vector of strategic
variables is (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n. S i is a convex and compact set in
a linear topological space for each i ∈ N. The payoff functions of the players are
ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn) for i ∈ N. We assume
ui for each i ∈ N is upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave on S i
for each s j ∈ S j, j ∈ N, j , i. It is lower semi-continuous and
quasi-convex on S j for j ∈ N, j , i for each si ∈ S i.
2About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Mat-
sushima and Cato (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka
(2014b), Tanaka (2013a), Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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Since the game is symmetric, all players have the same payoff function, and we
have
n∑
i=1
ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = 0, (1)
for given (s1, s2, . . . , sn) because we consider a zero-sum game. Also all S i’s are
identical. Denote them by S .
3. The main results
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) is
stated as follows.
Lemma 1 (Sion’s minimax theorem). Let X and Y be non-void convex and com-
pact subsets of two linear topological spaces, and let f : X×Y → R be a function
that is upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave in the first variable and lower
semi-continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable. Then
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y f (x, y) = miny∈Y maxx∈X
f (x, y).
We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005).
Suppose that sk ∈ S k for all k ∈ N other than i and j, j , i are given. Denote a
vector of such sk’s by s−i, j. Then, ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn) is written as ui(si, s j, s−i, j), and
it is a function of si and s j. We can apply Lemma 1 to such a situation, and get the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let j , i, and S i and S j be non-void convex and compact subsets of
two linear topological spaces, and let ui : S i×S j → R given s−i, j be a function that
is upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave on S i and lower semi-continuous and
quasi-convex on S j. Then
max
si∈S i
min
s j∈S j
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = min
s j∈S j
max
si∈S i
ui(si, s j, s−i, j).
We assume that argmaxsi∈S i mins j∈S j ui(si, s j, s−i, j) and argmins j∈S j maxsi∈S i ui(si, s j, s−i, j)
are single-valued for any pair of i and j. By the maximum theorem they are con-
tinuous in s−i, j.
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Consider the following function;
s1
s2
· · ·
sn
 →

argmaxs1∈S 1 mins2∈S 2 u1(s1, s2, s−1,2)
argmaxs2∈S 2 mins3∈S 3 u2(s2, s3, s−2,3)
· · ·
argmaxsn∈S n mins1∈S 1 un(sn, s1, s−1,n)
 ,
given (s1, s2, . . . , sn). This function is continuous, and each S i is convex and com-
pact. Therefore, there exists a fixed point (s˜1, s˜2, . . . , s˜n) (by Glicksberg’s fixed
point theorem (Glicksberg (1952))).
Similarly, we can consider the following function;
s1
s2
· · ·
sn
 →

argmins1∈S 1 maxs2∈S 1 u2(s1, s2, s−1,2)
argmins2∈S 2 maxs3∈S 3 u3(s2, s3, s−2,3)
· · ·
argminsn∈S n maxs1∈S 1 u1(sn, s1, s−1,n)
 ,
given (s1, s2, . . . , sn). This function also has a fixed point, (s˜′1, s˜
′
2, . . . , s˜
′
n).
Since we consider a symmetric game in which all players have the same payoff
function, we can assume that when s−i, j = s−k,l,
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = max
sk∈S
min
sl∈S
uk(sk, sl, s−k,l) = min
sl∈S
max
sk∈S
uk(sk, sl, s−k,l)
= min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j),
and
argmax
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = argmax
sk∈S
min
sl∈S
uk(sk, sl, s−k,l) = argmin
sl∈S
max
sk∈S
uk(sk, sl, s−k,l)
= argmin
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) for i, j, k, l ∈ N.
They mean
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = max
s j∈S
min
si∈S
u j(si, s j, s−i, j)
= min
si∈S
max
s j∈S
u j(si, s j, s−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j),
and
argmax
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = argmax
s j∈S
min
si∈S
u j(si, s j, s−i, j)
= argmin
si∈S
max
s j∈S
u j(si, s j, s−i, j) = argmin
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) for any i, j.
4
Then, we find (s˜′1, s˜
′
2, . . . , s˜
′
n) = (s˜1, s˜2, . . . , s˜n). Let s = (s, s, . . . , s). If (s1, s2, . . . , sn) =
s, all argmaxsi∈S mins j∈S ui(si, s j, s, . . . , s)’s and all argminsi∈S maxs j∈S u j(si, s j, s, . . . , s)’s
are the same. Thus, the fixed point obtained from above two functions is sym-
metric. Denote it by s˜ = (s˜, s˜, . . . , s˜). These arguments ensure the existence of
symmetric maximin and minimax strategies.
Summarizing the results, Sion’s minimax theorem for a symmetric multi-
person zero-sum game is stated as follows.
Theorem 1. Let S i’s for i ∈ N be non-void convex and compact subsets of linear
topological spaces, let ui : S i × S j → R given s˜−i, j be a function that is upper
semi-continuous and quasi-concave on S i and lower semi-continuous and quasi-
convex on S j for all j , i and i ∈ N, and S i = S for all i ∈ N. Then, there exists
s˜ = (s˜, s˜, . . . , s˜) such that
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = max
s j∈S
min
si∈S
u j(si, s j, s˜−i, j)
= min
si∈S
max
s j∈S
u j(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j),
and
argmax
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = argmax
s j∈S
min
si∈S
u j(si, s j, s˜−i, j)
= argmin
si∈S
max
s j∈S
u j(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = argmin
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) for any i, j,
where s˜−i, j = (s˜, s˜, . . . , s˜) for k ∈ N, k , i, j.
Now we consider a Nash equilibrium of a symmetric multi-person zero-sum
game. Let s∗i , i ∈ N, be the values of si’s which, respectively, maximize ui, i ∈ N,
given s∗j, j , i, in a neighborhood around (s
∗
1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
n) in S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n.
Then,
ui(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
i , . . . , s
∗
n) ≥ ui(s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n) for all si , s∗i , i ∈ N. (2)
Since the game is symmetric, we consider a symmetric equilibrium such that all
s∗i ’s are equal at equilibria. Thus, ui(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
i , . . . , s
∗
n)’s for all i are equal, and by
the property of zero-sum game they are zero. By symmetry of the game we have
u j(s
∗
1, . . . , si, . . . , s
∗
n) = uk(s
∗
1, . . . , si, . . . , s
∗
n) for j , i, k , i, j , k.
From this and (1)
−
n∑
j=1, j,i
u j(s
∗
1, . . . , si, . . . , s
∗
n) = −(n−1)u j(s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n) = ui(s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n).
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Therefore, from (2)
u j(s
∗
1, . . . , si, . . . , s
∗
n) ≥ u j(s∗1, . . . , s∗i , . . . , s∗n) for j , i.
By symmetry
ui(s
∗
1, . . . , s j, . . . , s
∗
n) ≥ ui(s∗1, . . . , s∗i , . . . , s∗n) for j , i.
Combining this and (2)
ui(s
∗
1, . . . , si, . . . , s
∗
n) ≤ ui(s∗1, . . . , s∗i , . . . , s∗n) ≤ ui(s∗1, . . . , s j, . . . , s∗n)
for all si , s∗i and all s j , s
∗
j, j , i, i ∈ N.
This is equivalent to
ui(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
i , . . . , s
∗
n) = maxsi
ui(s
∗
1, . . . , si, . . . , s
∗
n) = mins j
ui(s
∗
1, . . . , s j, . . . , s
∗
n),
j , i given s∗k, k , i, j,
Denote the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game by s∗ = (s∗, s∗, . . . , s∗).
Let s˜∗−i, j = (s˜
∗, s˜∗, . . . , s˜∗) for k ∈ N, k , i, j, and s˜−i, j = (s˜, s˜, . . . , s˜) for k ∈ N, k ,
i, j. We can show the following result.
Theorem 2. The following three statements are equivalent.
(1) There exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person
zero-sum game.
(2) There exists s˜ = (s˜, s˜, . . . , s˜) such that the following relation holds.
vsi ≡ maxsi mins j ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = mins j maxsi ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) ≡ v
s
j for any pair of i and j.
(3) There exists a real number vs, smi and s
m
j such that
ui(s
m
i , s j, s˜−i, j) ≥ vs for any s j, and ui(si, smj , s˜−i, j) ≤ vs for any si, (3)
for any pair of i and j.
Proof. (1 → 2)
Set s˜ = s∗. Then,
vsj = mins j
max
si
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤ maxsi ui(si, s
∗
j, s
∗
−i, j) = ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
j, s
∗
−i, j)
= min
s j
ui(s
∗
i , s j, s
∗
−i, j) ≤ maxsi mins j ui(si, s j, s
∗
−i, j) = v
s
i .
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On the other hand, mins j ui(si, s j, s
∗
−i, j) ≤ ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j), then maxsi mins j ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤
maxsi ui(si, s j, s
∗
−i, j), and so maxsi mins j ui(si, s j, s
∗
−i, j) ≤ mins j maxsi ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j).
Thus, vsi ≤ vsj, and we have vsi = vsj.
(2 → 3)
Set s˜ = s∗. Let smi = argmaxsi mins j ui(si, s j, s
∗
−i, j) (the maximin strategy),
smj = argmins j maxsi ui(si, s j, s
∗
−i, j) (the minimax strategy), and let vs = v
s
i = v
s
j.
Then, we have
ui(s
m
i , s j, s
∗
−i, j) ≥ mins j ui(s
m
i , s j, s
∗
−i, j) = maxsi
min
s j
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) = vs
= min
s j
max
si
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) = maxsi
ui(si, s
m
j , s
∗
−i, j) ≥ ui(si, smj , s∗−i, j).
By Theorem 1 smi = s˜ = s
∗ and smj = s˜ = s
∗.
(3 → 1)
Set s˜ = s∗. Since smi = s
m
j = s
∗ from (3) we get
ui(s
∗, s j, s∗−i, j) ≥ vs ≥ ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) for all si ∈ S i, s j ∈ S j.
Putting si = s∗i and s j = s
∗
j, we see vs = ui(s
∗, s∗, s∗−i, j) and s
∗ = (s∗, s∗, . . . , s∗) is
an equilibrium.
Therefore, Sion’s minimax theorem is equivalent to the existence of Nash
equilibrium of a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game.
4. Example of asymmetric multi-person zero-sum game
Consider a three-person game. Suppose that the payoff functions of players
are
pi1 = (a−s1−(s2+s3)s1−c1s1−12[(a−s2−(s1+s3)s2−c2s2+(a−s3−(s2+s1)s3−c3s3],
pi2 = (a−s2−(s1+s3)s2−c2s2−12[(a−s1−(s2+s3)s1−c1s1+(a−s3−(s2+s1)s3−c3s3],
and
pi3 = (a−s3−(s2+s1)s3−c3s3−12[(a−s1−(s2+s3)s1−c1s1+(a−s2−(s1+s3)s2−c2s2].
This is a model of relative profit maximization in a three firms Cournot oligopoly
with constant marginal cost and zero fixed cost producing a homogeneous good.
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si, i = 1, 2, 3 are the outputs of the firms. The conditions for maximization of
pii, i = 1, 2, 3 are
∂pi1
∂s1
= a − 2s1 − (s2 + s3) − c1 + 12(s2 + s3) = 0,
∂pi2
∂s2
= a − 2s2 − (s1 + s3) − c2 + 12(s1 + s3) = 0,
and
∂pi3
∂s3
= a − 2s3 − (s2 + s1) − c3 + 12(s2 + s1) = 0.
The Nash equilibrium strategies are
s1 =
3a − 5c1 + c2 + c3
9
, s2 =
3a − 5c2 + c1 + c3
9
, s3 =
3a − 5c3 + c2 + c1
9
. (4)
We consider maximin and minimax strategy about Player 1 and 2. The con-
dition for minimization of pi1 with respect to s2 is
∂pi1
∂s2
= 0. Denote s2 which
satisfies this condition by s2(s1, s3), and substitute it into pi1. Then, the condition
for maximization of pi1 with respect to s1 given s2(s1, s3) and s3 is
∂pi1
∂s1
+
∂pi1
∂s2
ds2
ds1
= 0.
We call the strategy of Player 1 obtained from these conditions the maximin strat-
egy of Player 1 to Player 2. It is denoted by argmaxs1 mins2 pi1. The condition for
maximization of pi1 with respect to s1 is
∂pi1
∂s1
= 0. Denote s1 which satisfies this
condition by s1(s2, s3), and substitute it into pi1. Then, the condition for minimiza-
tion of pi1 with respect to s2 given s1(s2, s3) is
∂pi1
∂s2
+
∂pi1
∂s1
ds1
d2
= 0.
We call the strategy of Player 2 obtained from these conditions the minimax strat-
egy of Player 2 to Player 1. It is denoted by argmins2 maxs1 pi1. In our example
we obtain
argmax
s1
min
s2
pi1 =
3a − 4c1 + c2
9
, argmin
s2
max
s1
pi1 =
6a − 9s3 − 2c1 − 4c2
9
.
Similarly, we get the following results.
argmax
s2
min
s1
pi2 =
3a − 4c2 + c1
9
, argmin
s1
max
s2
pi2 =
6a − 9s3 − 2c2 − 4c1
9
,
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argmax
s1
min
s3
pi1 =
3a − 4c1 + c3
9
, argmin
s3
max
s1
pi1 =
6a − 9s2 − 2c1 − 4c3
9
,
argmax
s3
min
s1
pi3 =
3a − 4c3 + c1
9
, argmin
s1
max
s3
pi3 =
6a − 9s2 − 2c3 − 4c1
9
,
argmax
s2
min
s3
pi2 =
3a − 4c2 + c3
9
, argmin
s3
max
s2
pi2 =
6a − 9s1 − 2c2 − 4c3
9
,
argmax
s3
min
s2
pi3 =
3a − 4c3 + c2
9
, argmin
s2
max
s3
pi3 =
6a − 9s1 − 2c3 − 4c2
9
.
If the game is asymmetric, for example, c2 , c3, argmaxs1 mins2 pi1 , argmaxs1 mins3 pi1,
argmaxs2 mins3 pi2 , argmaxs3 mins2 pi3, argmins3 maxs2 pi2 , argmins2 maxs3 pi3and
so on. However, if the game is symmetric, we have c2 = c3 = c1 and
argmax
s1
min
s2
pi1 = argmax
s2
min
s1
pi2 = argmax
s1
min
s3
pi1 = argmax
s3
min
s1
pi3
= argmax
s2
min
s3
pi2 = argmax
s3
min
s2
pi3 =
a − c1
3
.
All of the Nash equilibrium strategies of the players in (4) are also equal to a−c13 .
Assume s2 = s3 = s1 as well as c2 = c3 = c1. Then,
argmin
s2
max
s1
pi1 = argmin
s1
max
s2
pi2 = argmin
s3
max
s1
pi1 = argmin
s1
max
s3
pi3
= argmin
s3
max
s2
pi2 = argmin
s2
max
s3
pi3 =
2a − 3s1 − 2c1
3
.
Further, if
s1 = argmin
s1
max
s2
pi2 = argmin
s1
max
s3
pi3,
we obtain
argmin
s2
max
s1
pi1 = argmin
s1
max
s2
pi2 = argmin
s3
max
s1
pi1 = argmin
s1
max
s3
pi3
= argmin
s3
max
s2
pi2 = argmin
s2
max
s3
pi3 =
a − c1
3
.
Therefore, the maximin strategy, the minimax strategy and the Nash equilibrium
strategy for all players are equal.
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